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NOTE
Copyright Protection and Computer
Programs: Identifying Creative
Expression in a Computer Program's
Nonliteral Elements
INTRODUCTION
Congress granted copyright protection to computer programs
when it passed the new Copyright Act of 1976.1 Furthermore, Con-
gress chose to protect computer programs as a type of literary
work.2 Though at least one commentator has taken the position
that the "code in which the programs are written is analogous to the
text of other literary works," 3 courts and other commentators have
disagreed on how much copyright protection should be granted to a
programmer's work based on this analogy
1. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914, 102(a) (1988 & West Supp.
1992). The 1976 Copyright Act provides protection for "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Works of authorship include
literary works, and Congress categorized computer programs as literary works. See 17
U.S.C. § 102(a); see also infra notes 18, 25.
2. H.R. REP. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5667 ("The term 'literary works' ... includes ... computer programs ... :).
3. Mary L. Kevlin, Computer Cases-Bound for the Supreme Court?, N.Y. LJ.,
July 31,1992, at 3.
4. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Yaslow Dental Labs., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986)
(granting expansive protection), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); see also Anthony
L. Clapes, et al., Silicon Epics and Binary Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1493 (1987)
[hereinafter Clapes, Silicon Epics] (favoring expansive protection); but see Computer
Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., No. 91-7893, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305 (2d Cir.
June. 22, 1992) (granting limited protection); Peter G. Spivack, Comment, Does Form
Follow Functions? The IdealExpression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of Com-
puter Software, 35 UCLA L. REv. 723 (1988) (favoring limited protection).
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When courts have analogized the verbatim copying of a
program's code to the verbatim copying of a play or novel's text,
they have had little difficulty in applying the new law.5  Literal
copying often means infringement, whether the infringed work is a
novel or a computer program.
However in cases involving the copying of the "nonliteral ' 6
elements of programs, courts have had more difficulty in applying
the analogy.7 Traditional copyright law protects against copying of
the plot or structure of a novel or play. However, when called
upon to grant the same protection to the structure or organization
of a computer program, courts and commentators have faltered.
Some argue that these elements should not be protected at all under
copyright law." Even those who believe that nonliteral program
elements warrant protection have struggled to find a workable test
for determining when infringement of these elements has occurred?
Most of the difficulty has been in finding a means of distinguishing
when a program's nonliteral elements are the author's expression
and when they are mere ideas. Making this distinction is of
5. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
6. The cases involving infrngement of the nonliteral elements of computer
programs can be divided into two main categories: (1) the "touch and feel" cases, which
involve copying the way a program appears to the user; and (2) the "structure, sequence
and organization!' (SSO) cases which involve copying the way a program is designed
and organized. The SSO cases involve copying that is opaque to the user.
7. Compare Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Controls Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173,
1175 (9th Cir. 1989) (structure of program was held to be copyrightable expression) and
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990)
(flowchart, if sufficiently detailed, could be afforded copyright protection) with Plains
Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.)
(holding that because program's structure was dictated by external market forces it was
an unprotectable idea under copyright law), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
8. See Randall M. Whitmeyer, Comment, A Plea for Due Processes: Defining the
Proper Scope of Patent Protection for Computer Software, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1103,
1123-25 (1991) cited with approval in Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., No.
91-7893,1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *57 (2d Cir. June 22,1992).
9. SAS Inst. Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn.
1985); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Systems, Inc., 886 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir.
1989).
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paramount importance since the Copyright Act only protects an
author's expression and not the idea that is being expressed."°
In 1986, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit addressed this issue in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratory, Inc." In Whelan, the court enunciated a test
for separating idea from expression that extended protection to a
program's nonliteral elements. Since that time the Whelan test has
been widely applied and rigorously debated. 2 However, in 1992,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. 3 denounced
the Whelan test as overly broad and, relying heavily on expert
opinion, formulated a new, more restrictive test for distinguishing
idea from expression.
This note contends that both the Whelan test and the Altai test
fail to accord copyright protection for software to the extent
contemplated by the Copyright Act of 1976 and traditional
copyright doctrine. This is true despite the fact that Whelan and
Altai reached opposite conclusions as to the proper scope of
copyright protection for computer programs. Sometimes a
programmer employs pure creativity to effect a design solution.
Other times, the programmer merely complies with rigid system
dictates or business demands. Whelan viewed the programmer's
work solely as the former; Altai severely overemphasized the latter.
Both failed by. adhering to a one-sided view of the process of
computer programming.
Computer programs are protected as literary works under the
Copyright Act of 1976 and Part I of this note reviews some of the
traditional tests used by courts to distinguish between idea and
expression when dealing with literary works. Part II examines the
Whelan decision and discusses how it granted overly broad
protection to a programmer's works. Part I discusses the recent
10. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
11. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
12. See discussion infra Part IL Debate over the Whelan test ranged from
questioning whether computer programs should be protected by copyright at all to the
overbreadth of the test itself.
13. No. 91-7893,1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305 (2d Cir. Tune 22,1992).
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Altai decision and analyzes how it unduly restricted copyright
protection for a programmer's work. Part IV argues that neither
the Whelan nor the Altai test is correct, and that absent
Congressional clarification, any court that attempts its own solution
is unlikely to have success fashioning a workable test. This note
concludes that if computer programs are to be ensured the proper
amount of copyright protection, Congress needs to clarify the
copyright law as it pertains to computer programs. Only then will
courts be able effectively to apply the vast body of copyright law
and doctrine to the newest form of literary work.
I. THE HISTORY AND ROLE OFTHE IDEA/EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY
In order to understand more fully the present debate 4 over how
to determine infringement of copyright for the nonliteral elements
of computer programs, it is useful to begin with two brief inquiries:
First, an examination of the history and purpose of the statutory
protection of computer programs as literary works; and second, a
delineation of the common law tests for copyright infringement of
literary works that have been applied in computer program cases. 5
A. Congress' Decision to Protect Computer Programs as
Literary Works
Copyright originates in the Constitution which provides that
Congress may "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' 6 Traditionally,
14. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
15. These judicially created tests were being used at the time Congress decided to
include computer programs as literary works in the copyright statute. See infra notes
31-55 and accompanying text.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. From the time of the Founding there has been a
duality of purpose in copyright law: "to promote the public disclosure of and dis-
semination of works of 'authorship'; [yet] on the other hand ... to confer on the creat-
ors the power to restrict or deny distribution of their works." Peter Taszi, Towards a
Theory of Copyright: Metamorphoses of Authorship, 1991 DUKE L.. 455, 463 (1992).
This commentator has also suggested that this tension is the basis for most copyright
(Vol. 3:89
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Congress has accorded authors and inventors protection for their
works depending on the nature of the work: Copyright law
protects literary works, while patent law protects novel utilitarian
works.'7 Since the Constitution was written, Congress has passed
several copyright statutes, each statute enlarging the scope of
works protected by copyright 8 However, when Congress began
extensively revising the federal copyright law in the 1970s, it faced
a difficult decision: whether computer programs should be
protected by copyright, or whether some other means of intellectual
property protection was more appropriate.' 9 To aid in deciding
these questions, Congress established the National Commission on
doctrines such as merger and scenes faire. Id. at 464.
17. Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for
Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1989). Also, the patent and
copyright laws vary as to the type and scope ofprotection they give.
When Congress exercised its broad Constitutional Authority to enact patent
and copyright laws in order to promote the progress of science and the -useful
arts, Congress took substantially different approaches in balancing competing
interests. Under copyright law, authors are afforded much weaker protection
than inventors are afforded under patent law: copyright gives no protection for
ideas, no matter how original, and no protection against independent creation.
In light of this weak protection, the subject matter capable of being protected
is much broader in scope than under patent law (original authorship rather
than novel and non-obvious inventions) and the terms of protection is much
longer. These trade-offs reflect a reasonable and carefully crafted balancing
by Congress of the various diverse interests it was seeking to further.
Allen R. Grogan, Bonito Boats and Whelan: A Simple Contrast Between Patent and
CopyrightLaw, CompumE LAW., July 1989, at 33, 34.
18. Clapes, SiliconEpics, supra note 4, at 1493 n.4:
The first congressional copyright statute, passed in 1790, governed only maps,
charts, and books. In 1802, the Act was amended in order to grant protection
to any person "who shall invent and design, engrave, etch or work.., any
historical or other print or prints ... .. Protection was extended to musical
compositions when the copyright laws were revised in 1831. In 1865, at the
time when Matthew Brady's pictures of the Civil War were attaining fame,
photographs and photographic negatives were expressly added to the list of
protected works. Again in 1870, the list was augmented to cover paintings,
drawings, chromos, statuettes, statuary, and models or designs of fine art.
(citing Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555-56 (1973) (citations omitted)). In
1909, the Congress greatly revised the statute and extended copyright protection to
motion pictures. The 1909 Act was amended in 1971 to include soundrecordings. Id.
19. See Menell, supra note 17, at 1046-47.
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New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU).)
"The purpose of [CONTU] was ... to study the reproduction
and use of copyrighted works in conjunction with computers, and
to make recommendations as to any necessary changes to be made
in the copyright law."2' While CONTU was studying the issue,
Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976.2 which explicitly
mandated that computer programs were to be treated as literary
works for copyright purposes. All works covered under the new
statute-including computer programs-were protected?4 insofar as
they embodied an author's particular expression; the ideas behind
that expression, however, were denied protection.2Y In copyright
20. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873. The CONTU
Report is usually considered the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 with
respect to computer programs. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d
255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988) (courts "rely on the CONTU Report as an expression of
legislative intent"); Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp, 33, 35 n.7 (D.
Mass. 1984) (the CONTU Report is considered an expression of legislative intent);
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741,750 n.6 (N.D. I. 1983) (same); Steven
Englund, Note, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression?: Determining the Scope of
Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 McH. L. REv. 866,
886 (1990) ("[Sleveral courts have considered the CONTU Report a reflection of
legislative intent.., with respect to the 1976 [Copyright] Act."); Cary S. Kappel, Note,
Copyright Protection of SSO: Replete With Internal Deficiencies and Practical
Dangers, 59 FOnDmHAM L. REV. 699, 701 (1990) ("The report is generally considered the
legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act."). But see Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. laslow
Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1242 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that the CONTU Report
is only the legislative history for those provisions which Congress amended in response
to CONTU's suggestions).
21. Melville Nimmer, Declaration Regarding the National Commission of New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) Final Report 1 3 (Nov. 15, 1984),
reprinted in Clapes, Silicon Epics, supra note 4, at 1585 [hereinafter Melville B.
Nimmer Declaration].
22. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988 & West Supp. 1992).
23. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
24. The owner of a valid copyright has the exclusive right to copy, prepare
derivative works, distribute, perform or display the copyrighted work, subject to certain
limitations. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
25. See supra note 1. Further, "[iln no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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cases involving literary works, this distinction had often played a
critical role, and in the new law Congress explicitly stated that it
should also apply to computer programs: "[Clomputer programs
[should be protected under the new statute] to the extent that they
incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression of original
ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves." In its final
report, CONTU concurred with Congress' decision, stating that
"computer programs, to the extent that they embody an author's
original creation, are [the] proper subject matter of copyright."2'
CONTU also did not criticize Congress' decision to classify
computer programs as literary works.2 Congress' decisions, both
to include computer programs under the existing copyright
category of literary works and to apply the idea/expression
distinction.' indicated its broader intention to integrate computer
programs into existing copyright law and theory."
B. The Role of the IdealExpression Distinction in Literary
Copyright Infringement Cases
When applying the copyright law in computer software copy-
right infrngement cases, courts have looked to traditional literary
copyright cases for guidance as to how to apply the idea/expression
26. H.R. REP. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659,5667.
27. Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (1979), reprinted in 3 CoMPUTr-Rm L. 53 (1981) [hereinafter CON-
TU REPORT]. CONTU recommended three changes to the new 1976 Copyright
Statute. Id. One recommendation was that "[t]he new copyright law should be amend-
ed: (1) to make it explicit that computer programs, to the extent that they embody an
author's original intention, are proper subject matter for copyright" Id. The other two
recommendations are beyond the scope of this discussion.
28. Id.
29. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 54 (D. Mass.
1990). Some commentators have suggested that this is not what Congress intended and
that the mention of the idea/expression distinction was nothing more than a restatement
of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). See supra note 25 for text of § 102(b).30. Lotus Dev. Corp., 740 F. Supp. at 54 (Congress' "conclusion is also consistent
with the object and policies of copyright-to encourage the creation and dissemination
of new ideas by protecting, for limited times, the specific way that an author has
expressed those ideas.:) (emphasis in original).
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distinction. "In order to prove ififringement a plaintiff must show
ownership of a valid copyright and copying by the defendant" 3'
The infringement may consist of literal duplication or the appro-
priation of nonliteral elements.32 Further, evidence of copying may
be direct or indirect.' Though courts have developed several dif-
ferent approaches for using indirect evidence in proving nonliteral
copying, they usually follow one of the two approaches outlined
below.' Though each of these approaches is often referred to as
the "substantial similarity test,'" the two are in reality very different
tests. Each test asks the same question: Is there substantial sim-
ilarity? The tests differ, however, as to when in the sequence of in-
quiry the court asks this question. This difference in timing the
question usually determines how a court will approach the larger
issue of illicit copying.
One clearly articulated test for determining if two works are
substantially similar is the two-pronged test offered in Arnstein v.
Porter.36 Under this test, there is substantial similarity on a finding:
(a) that defendant copied from plaintiffs copyrighted work and (b)
that the copying, if proved, went so far as to constitute improper
31. Novelty Textile Mills v. loan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir.
1977).
32. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121-22 (1930) (Judge
Learned Hand stated that "[i]t is... essential to any protection of literary property...
that the right cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by
immaterial variations.").
33. Copying is rarely proved by direct evidence of the "physical act of copying." 3
MELVIL B. NIMER & DAVID NMmR, NnffiMR ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.01[B], 13.10
(1991) [hereinafter NIMM]ER. Copying is more often proved by indirect evidence, such
as by proving access and substantial similarity. Id. § 13.10.01 (citing cases).
34. Howard Root, Note, Copyright Infringement of Compjuter Programs: A
Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MNN. L. REv. 1264, 1280 (1984)
(tracing the use of the substantial similarity test in cases involving literary works).
35. Id. at 1276.
36. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947). The late
Professor Latman stated that "the clearly articulated copyright approach of [the Arnstein
case], when properly understood, remains the most instructive guide to proving
infringement." Alan Latman, Probative Similarity As Proof of Copying: Toward
Dispelling Some Myths In Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1185, 1191
(1990).
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appropriation.
If there is evidence of access"S and similarities exist, then the
trier of fact [may reasonably infer copying] .... If the
evidence of access is absent, the similarities must be so
striking as to preclude the possibility that plaintiff and
defendant independently arrived at the same result .... If
copying is established, then only does there arise the second
issue, that of illicit copying (unlawful appropriation)?9
Professor Alan Latman further explicated the parameters of illicit
copying as set forth in Arnstein:
[A]ssuming that adequate proof is made of copying, that is
not enough; for there can be "permissible copying," copying
which is not illicit. Whether... [the] defendant unlawfully
appropriated [is the second] issue of fact . . . . The
question, therefore, is whether defendant. . . wrongfully
appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.'
Since only the author's expression "belongs" to him, it is at this
second stage of the inquiry that the court must differentiate
between protected expression and unprotected idea.4' Because
copying has been proved, the court now asks if what the defendant
copied was protectable expression. Asking the questions in this
order properly delays the complicated task of distinguishing idea
from expression. This is important because proof that there was
"copying of uncopyrighted components of a work clearly has some
probative value in establishing the copying of other, copyrighted,
components of the same work."42  Therefore, when a court
37. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467.
38. Access has been defined as "the opportunity to view the copyrighted work."
See NrazER, supra note 33, § 13.02[A]. Others have held access to be the actual
viewing and knowledge of the copyrighted work. See Bradbury v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. 287 F.2d 478, 479 (9th Cir. 1961), cited with approval in Root,
supra note 34, at 1278 n.88.
39. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 466. Expert testimony may be considered by the trier of
fact during the first prong but not during the second. Id.
40. Latman, supra note 36, at 1192-93.
41. Id. at 1195.
42. Id.
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distinguishes unprotectable idea from protectable expression it does
so knowing that the defendant has copied. This keeps the focus of
the court's inquiry on the defendant's copying, not the
protectability of the plaintiff's works.
Since Arnstein, other courts have approached the issue in a
different way. These courts have collapsed the two prongs of the
Arnstein inquiry into a test of access and substantial similarity.43
This test will be referred to as the compressed version of the
Arnstein test.4M If access is not shown, but the works are strikingly
similar, an inference of copying may be drawn without proof of
access.45 If, however, access is found, then the court asks if the
works are substantially similar and if "the [substantial] similarities
relate to copyrightable material."'' By this means, the court ends
up evaluating whether works are similar (because they share
unprotected ideas or protected expression) without establishing
whether there was copying in general. Neither the Arnstein two-
pronged test or the compressed version, however, offers a court
guidance on how to make the distinction between idea and
expression.
In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,'7 Judge Learned Hand
articulated his abstractions test as a means of separating and
distinguishing idea from expression when faced with circumstantial
evidence of nonliteral copying.' The Nichols court began by as-
suming, arguendo, that the defendant had-to some degree-used
the plaintiff's copyrighted work in preparing his own. 49 The court
43. Novelty Textile Mills v. loan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir.
1977); Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *19; Altai, 775 F. Supp. 544, 557
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (both citing Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986).
44. Lalman, supra note 36, at 1188.
45. 3 NMMER, supra note 33, §13.03[B].
46. Walker, 784 F.2d at 48.
47. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
48. Id. The case involved the motion picture play "The Cohens and The Kellys"
which was held not to infringe the copyright in the play characters in "Abie's Irish
Rose." Both works were comedies involving secret inter-faith marriages and the
complications that arise as the disapproving families gradually discover the truth. The
infingement claim focused on similarity of the plot and characters.
49. Id. at 120.
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then went on to discuss at length the similarity of the two works
and the extent to which that similarity was comprised of protected
expression.
Upon any work, . a great number of patterns of
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more
of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more
than the most general statement of what the [work] is
about... but there is a point in this series of abstractions
where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the
[author] could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which,
apart from their expression, his property never extended.
Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody
ever can.
50
Thus in Nichols, as in Arnstein, the final determination of
whether there was illicit nonliteral appropriation depended on how
the court characterized what was taken-whether it was idea or
expression, whether it was material that belonged to the public or
to the plaintiff.
This final distinction between idea and expression defines the
boundary of copyright protection,5 since material deemed an idea
will not be accorded copyright protection. To draw this boundary,
a court must resolve the conflicting interests present in copyright
law-viz, providing enough protection for authors' work to
maintain creative incentive while encouraging the dissemination of
knowledge and science to the public5 2 Thus, every time a court
must make the idea/expression distinction, it must also resolve these
50. Id. at 121 (citations omitted).
51. See Clapes, Silicon Epics, supra note 4, at 1550.
52. See Iaszi, supra note 16, at 464-65. See also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback
Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 54 (D. Mass. 1990) ("Tihe objects and policies of
copyright [are] to encourage the creation and dissemination of new ideas by protecting,
for limited times, the specific way that an author has expressed those ideas.") (emphasis
in original); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738,742 (9th Cir.
1971) (The principal consideration when drawing the line between idea and expression
"is the preservation of the balance between competition and protection reflected in the
patent and copyright laws."); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 432 (1984) (granting a limited monopoly will provide sufficient incentive for
authors to createnew works).
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tensions anew.Y
It is the complexity inherent in the idea/expression
distinction-and not the unsuitability of protecting computer
programs as literary works under the copyright law-that has
perplexed courts adjudicating computer program copyright cases
involving non-verbatim copying.' The difficulty courts have exper-
ienced in resolving this distinction has been further compounded
because "computer programs as a form of expression are not well
understood by makers of law and policy.""5 Courts thus find them-
selves balancing elements they do not fully understand. For a test
of copyright infringement to be meaningful in computer program
cases, both these areas must be addressed.
R. A BROAD SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECION UNDER WHELAN
AssocIATEs, INC. V. JASLOWDENTAL LABORATORY, INC.
The copyright infringement action brought in Whelan
Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.5 involved two
computer programs for managing the business operations of a
dental laboratoryY The defendant Jaslow owned and operated a
dental laboratory and hired the plaintiff Whelan, a computer
programmer, to write a program for managing the business
operations of his dental lab.58 The two agreed that Whelan would
53. See Iaszi, supra note 16, at 464-65; see also Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
54. Despite the consensus between Congress and CONTU to include computer
programs under the umbrella of copyright law, their decision has been criticized for
being at odds with the fundamental principle that copyright cannot protect "any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery." See
Menell, supra note 17, at 1046-47; Computer Assocs. Int'I, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F.
Supp. 544, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Since the behavioral aspect of a computer program
falls within the statutory terms 'process,' 'system,' and 'method of operation,' it may be
excluded by statute from copyright protection. Indeed, it has been suggested that
computer software is better protected by patent law than by copyright law.") (citing
Whitmeyer, supra note 8, at 1123-25).
55. See Clapes, Silicon Epics, supra note 4, at 1499.
56. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
57. Id. at 1225-26.
58. Id. at 1225. See Thomas M. Gage, Note, Whelan Associates v. aslow Dental
Laboratories: Copyright Protection for Computer Software Structure- What's the
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own the copyright in the program while Jaslow would use the
program.59  Further, Jaslow was to act as Whelan's sales
representative in marketing the program, called DENTALAB, to
other dental laboratories. 60 Two years after Whelan completed the
DENTALAB program for Jaslow, Jaslow began selling a similar
program, called DENTACOM, which was written in a different
language.6' Whelan brought suit for copyright infiingement a
Following a trial without a jury, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that sales of the
DENTCOM system violated Whelan's copyright' Jaslow appeal-
ed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The
sole issue before the Third Circuit was whether the district court
was correct in holding that a computer program's structure was
protected by copyright 1aw.6 The Third Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision: A computer program's structure was
Purpose?, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 859, 875-78 (more elaborate discussion of the facts in
Whelan). Whelan owned half the company that Taslow had hired to write the program.
Id.
59. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1225. Initially the company that Whelan worked for-
and was half owner of-held the copyright to DENTALAB. After completing the
DENTALAB program for laslow, Whelan formed her own company, Whelan
Associates, which became the new holder of the DENTALAB copyright Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1226-27. The business relationship worked successfully for two years.
However, Whelan had written DENTALAB in the computer language EDL, and many
of the smaller dental labs did not own computers that could process EDL. laslow
realized that there was a market for a similar program written in a more popular
computer language. laslow produced such a program using BASIC instead of EDL.
That new program, called DENTCOM, became the alleged copyright infringer. Id. at
1226.
62. Id. at 1227.
63. Whelan, 609 F. Supp. 1307,1321-22 (E.D. Pa. 1985). The district court found
copyright infringement because DENTCOM was not independently created. Jaslow had
access to DENTALAB, and there was substantial similarity between DENTCOM and
DENTALAB. Id. The district court did find that the two programs were substantially
similar in their structure and overall organization. Id. at 1321-22.
64. On appeal Jaslow contended that the district court had erred in finding
copyright infringement because of the substantial similarity of the two programs'
structure and overall organization. Jaslow asserted that only the literal elements of the
program-in this case the code-were protectable expression. Whelan, 797 F.2d at
1233.
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protected by copyright law. Further, there was sufficient evidence
to uphold the district court's finding of substantial similarity
between DENT-COM and DENTALAB.65
The Third Circuit began by noting that the Copyright Act of
1976 "extends copyright protection to literary works, and that
computer programs are classified as literary works for the purposes
of copyright."6 Further, "the copyrights of other literary works can
be infrnged even when there is no substantial similarity between the
works' literal elements." 67 The court reasoned that "[b]y analogy to
other literary works, it would. . . appear that the copyrights of
computer programs can be infinged even absent copying of the
literal elements of the program. '
The court then considered the defendant's contention that
"what is true of other literary works is not true of computer pro-
grams." 6' The court noted that "[ilt is axiomatic that copyright.
does not protect ideas, but only expressions of ideas," 7 and that
"[ilt is frequently difficult to distinguish the idea from the expres-
sion thereof."' The court disagreed, however, with Judge Hand's
assertion that such a distinction will "inevitably be ad hoc."2
Instead, the court undertook to "formulate a rule applicable in this
case.
' 273
In formulating its own test, the court stated that
because the line between idea and expression is elusive, we
must pay particular attention to the pragmatic consider-
ations that underlie the distinction and copyright law gen-
erally .... We must remember that the purpose of copy-
65. Id. at 1248.
66. Id. at 1234 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,5667).
67. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234 (citations omitted).
68. Id. (citing 3 NaMMa, supra note 33, § 13.03[A]).
69. Id. at 1234.
70. Id. (citing Bakery. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
71. Id. at 1235.
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right law is to create the most efficient and productive bal-
ance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of in-
formation, to promote learning, culture and development.74
The court used Baker v. Selden7 as the starting point for distin-
guishing idea from expression. 6 It reasoned that "[j]ust as Baker v.
Selden focused on the end sought to be achieved by Selden's book,
the line between idea and expression may be drawn with reference
to the end sought to be achieved by the work in question." The
court concluded that
the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the
work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that
purpose or function would be part of the expression of the
idea .... Where there are various means of achieving the
desired purpose, then the particular means chosen is not
necessary to the purpose; hence, there is expression, not
idea.7"
Thus, under the Whelan test, how the court distinguishes idea from
expression depends exactly on how the court defines the program's
endpurpose or objective.79
Applying its new test to the facts of the case, the court found
that "the purpose of the utilitarian DENTALAB program was to aid
74. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
75. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). The case involved a book that described a method of
accounting and forms that were to be used with thatmethod. The Court held that where
the method of accounting described in the book
cannotbe used without employing the methods and diagrams used to
illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such methods and
diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and
given [therewith] to the public.
Applying this test, the Court held that the blank forms were necessary
incidents to Selden's method of accounting, and hence were not entitled to any
copyrightprotection.
Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236 (quoting Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 103) [citations
omitted].
76. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citation omitted).
79. Gage, supra note 58, at 881.
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in the business operations of a dental laboratory."' Having defined
the purpose, the court stated that a programmer pould write other
programs, using a different structure and organization, that would
aid in the business operations of a dental lab. The court reasoned
that, because any number of structures could have been used, no
one structure was a necessary part of the program's purpose and
idea. Therefore, the structure Whelan had chosen to employ was
part of her expression and was thus protectable under copyright
law.81
The Whelan court was aware that the copyright protection it
was granting to computer programs was broad and that such broad
protection had been criticized in the past.' Criticism of broad
protection for computer software such as that allowed by the
Whelan test is based in large part on the belief that "progress in the
[computer industry] is achieved by means of 'stepping stones,' a
process that 'requires plagiarizing in some manner the underlying
copyrighted work.""' As a result, "giving computer programs too
much copyright protection will retard progress in the field." 4
The Whelan court responded that it did not believe that
computer technology was significantly different from
progress in other areas of sciences or the arts. In balancing
protection and dissemination, the copyright law has always
recognized and tried to accommodate the fact that all
intellectual pioneers build on the work of their predecessors.
Thus, copyright principles derived from other areas are
80. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238.
81. The court noted when this test should not be applied:
Different computer systems may functionally serve similar purposes without
being copies of each other. There is evidence in the record that there are other
software programs for the business management of dental laboratories in
competition with plaintiff's program. There is no contention that any of them
infringe although they may incorporate many of the same ideas and functions.
Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238-39.
82. Id. at 1237-38.
83. Id. at 1238 (citing Root, supra note 34, at 1292).
84. Id.
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applicable in the field of computer programs.5
Therefore, if application of those principles results in broad
protection, then that is consistent with copyright law as applied to
literary works.
The Whelan court's approach has been applied to some degree
in the majority of computer software cases since the decision was
announced in 1986.0 Cases rejecting the Whelan approach have
been in the minorityYu By contrast, Whelan has been widely
criticized in the academic community. Criticism has focused on
two aspects of the decision: (1) The overly broad definition of
expression, and (2) the negative impact that broad copyright
protection could have on the computer industry.'
85. Id. (citation omitted).
86. See generally Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37,
55 (D. Mass. 1990) (citing Whelan for the proposition that "[E]opyright protection of
computer programs may extend beyond the program's literal code to their structure,
sequence and organization!'); Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. American Express Bank, Ltd.,
No. 88 Civ. 2103,1990 WL48098, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6,1990); Healthcare Affiliated
Servs., Inc. v. Lippany, 701 F. Supp. 1142, 1151-52 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (analyzing
whether there was substantial similarity in the structure, sequence and organization of a
program within the meaning of Whelan); Broderbund Software Inc. v. Unison World,
Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (following the reasoning of Whelan to
hold that the overall structure, sequence and arrangement of computer software is
within the scope of copyright protection); Digital Communications Assocs. Inc. v.
Softidone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449,455 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (citing Whelan for the
proposition that a program's structure, sequence and organization are copyrightable);
Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. Planning & Control, Inc., 1987 Copyright L. Dec.(CCH) §
26,062, 20,912 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (f agree with the Third Circuit's careful analysis in
Whelan Associates that to the extent structural similarities in a computer program are
'notnecessary to [the] purpose or function' of the program, they constitute a protectable
expression of an idea."); Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Computer Protection for
Software Redefined, N.Y. LT., Tuly 14,1992, at 3, 4.
87. Plains Cotton Co-op v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256,
1262 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987); cf. Synercom Technology, Inc. v.
University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1014 (N.D. Tex. 1987). See generally
Raysman & Brown, supra, at4.
88. Whitmeyer, supra note 8, at 1128; Menell, supra note 17, at 1074, 1082;
Englund, supra note 20, at 881; Gage, supra note 58, at 882; Marc T. Kretschmer, Note,
CopyrightProtection For Software Architecture: Just Say No!, 3 COLTJM. Bus. L. REv.
823, 837-39 (1988); Spivack, supra note 4, at 747-55; 3 NIMMER, supra note 33, §
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Critics89 noted a crucial flaw in the Whelan test: It identified
the idea of a program solely in terms of the end function of a
program. This presented two problems. First, most programs
performed more than one function; thus-under the Whelan
definition of idea-they appeared to contain more than one idea.00
However, under Whelan, only one function-the end
function-was unpro-tected idea. This implied that the ideas of all
of a program's sub-functions became protected expression.9' Such
an outcome would be in direct conflict with the copyright law,
which held that ideas were unprotectable.
Second, the breadth of a program's idea was dictated by how
broadly or narrowly the court defined the end function of the
program. 92 If the end purpose of a program was broadly defined,
then the idea of the program was broadly defined;- this left little of
the program as protectable expression. Conversely, if the end
purpose of a program was narrowly defined, the idea of the
program was narrow. This in turn left most of the program as
protectable expression. A court could thus provide any level of
protection it chose based on the breadth of the definition it selected
for a program's end purpose.-4 In the end, the inaccuracy of the
Whelan test left it both in direct conflict with copyright law and
open to manipulation by the courts.
Commentators also feared the long-range effects of the Whelan
test on the computer software industry. They believed that a broad
definition of expression would "enable first comers to 'lock up'
basic programming techniques as implemented in programs to
perform particular tasks."' 5 They argued that since the computer
industry grows by building on the work of others, overly broad
13.03[F] at 13-78.33.
89. Kretschmer, supra note 88, at 837-38; Spivack, supra note 4, at 747-48; 3
NIMMR, supra note 33, § 13.031:F] at 13-78.33.
90. See Kretschmer, supra note 88, at 836; Spivack, supra note 4, at 747-48.
91. See Kretschmer, supra note 88, at 838-39.
92. See Englund, supra note 20, at 881; see also Gage, supra note 58, at 881.
93. See Englund, supra note 20, at 881; Spivack, supra note 4, at 750; Gage, supra
note 58, at 881.
94. See Englund, supra note 20, at 881; Gage, supra note 58, at 882.
95. Menell, supra note 17, at 1082.
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protection of the basic building blocks of the field could greatly
hamper future developrnent.6 The outcome of this would be that
the "development of new programs may decrease and new program
costs might increase relative to what would occur in the absence of
copyright protection for program structure."
Commentators posed alternatives to the Whelan test. Some
simply argued that patent law, not copyright law, was the correct
form of protection for computer programs.9  Others maintained
that copyright was the correct form of protection but that a new
test was needed to identify protectable expression." One proposed
alternative was the "successive filtering method" set forth by David
Nimmer.101
Nimmer's test called for a successive application of various
tests to filter out the non-protectable material in a computer pro-
gram. One of the various tests to be applied was the abstractions
test.'02 The other tests were based on copyright doctrines such as
merger.. and scenes h faire.'" Nimmer's "successive filtering
96. See Davidinmuner, et al.,A Structured Approach to Analyzing the Substantial
Similarity of Computer Software in Copyright Infringement Cases, 20 AIz. ST. LJ.
625, 630 (1988) [hereinafter NimmerA StructuredApproach].
97. Gage, supra note 58, at 881. At the time of its Whelan decision, the Third
Circuit was aware that some commentators believed that"giving computer programs too
much copyright protection will retard progress in the field." However, the court had
stated that it did not believe that progress in computer teclmology was significantly
different from "progress in the others areas of sciences or the arts. In balancing
protection and dissemination, the copyright law has always recognized and tried to
accommodate the fact that all intellectual pioneers build on the work of their
predecessors. Thus, copyright principles derived from other areas are applicable in the
field of computer programs" Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238 (citation omitted).
98. See Menell, supra note 17, at 1083.
99. See Englund, supra note 20, at 867; Clapes, Silicon Epics, supra note 18, at
1546.
100. See Englund, supra note 20, at 881 (suggesting that identifying the
protectable expression in a computer program involves distinguishing process from
expression as well as idea from expression); see also 3 NMME, supra note 33, §
13.03MP], 13-78.26 to .30.
101. 3 NIMM.R, supra note 33, § 13.03[F].
102. Id. at 13-78.30-.35; see supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text for explan-
ation of the abstractions test.
103. Id. at 13-78.35 to .36; see infra note 139 for explanation of the merger
108 FORDHAM ENT., MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. L.F.
method" took into account the realities of computer programming.
It also took into account the need for a test that could be applied by
non-specialists and which would yield just results.I"' This "suc-
cessive filtering method" formed the basis for the test that the
Second Circuit applied in Computer Associates International, Inc.
v. Altai, Inc.1es
III. A NARROWBRP SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PRomcTION UNDER
COMPUTER ASSOCIATES INTERAATIONAL, INC. V. ALTAr, INC.
The copyright infringement action brought in Computer
Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc'07 involved a job
scheduling program for IBM mainframe computers."S Since "main-
frame computers use different operating systems'09 ... , normally a
program would have to come in different versions for each
operating system.""0 However, Computer Associates' job sched-
uling program, called CA-SCHEDULER, was designed so that a
single version could be run on different operating systems. This
was done through the use of an internal translator, or adapter,
doctrine.
104. Id. at 13-78.36 to .42; see infra note 140 for an explanation of the scenes A
faire doctrine.
105. See Nimmer, A StructuredApproach, supra note 96, at 626.
106. Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., No. 91-7893, 1992 U.S. App. LEX[S
14305 (2d Cir. June 22,1992).
107. Id.
108. Id. at *10 ("[The] primary functions [of a job scheduling program] are
straightforward: to create a schedule specifying when the computer should run various
tasks, and then to control the computer as it executes the schedule.").
109. Operating systems were correctly described for the Altai court as:
the programs that manage the resources of the computer and allocate those
resources to other programs that need them. For example, functions that
operating system software might perform include providing blocks of memory
to an application program that requires them, or allocating processing time
among several application programs running on the computer at the same
time.
Brief for Appellant at 5, Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., No. 91-7893, 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 14305 (2d Cir. June 22, 1992) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
110. Kevlin, supra note 3, at 3.
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module called ADAPTER. " *
The defendant Altal also marketed a job scheduling program
called ZEKE. Though initially Altai's ZEKE program could run on
only one operating system," 2 Altai eventualy created a new job
scheduling program that could run on multiple operating systems.'
Alta's new product contained an adapter module which Altai
named OSCAR 3.4.2" The OSCAR 3.4 adapter module was
similar to Computer Associates' ADAPTER 5 and, in fact, was
created by a former employee of Computer Associates." 6
Altai marketed its new product for three years before Computer
111. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *10-11. More specifically, the job
scheduling program was broken down into two distinct components. The first
component performed the actual job scheduling. The second component served as an
interface or adapter between the first component and the operating system. According
to the Appellant:
In a program constructed in this way, whenever the first, task-specific,
component needs to ask the operating system for some resource, it calls the
second component instead of calling the operating system directly. Since the
first, task-specific component calls the adapter component rather than the
operating system, the first componentneed not be customized to any operating
system. The adapter component insures that all the system calls are
performed properly for the particular operating system in use .... This
approach has two very desirable effects. First, to adapt a program to a new
version of an existing operating system or an entirely new operating system,
the developer generally need only modify the adapter component Second,
revisions to the task-specific component of the program to correct problems or
add feature will not affect the program's ability to run under all operating
systems.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 109, at 6-7.
Though the infringement action involved the ADAPTER module, "ADAPTER
(was] not an independently marketed product of [Computer Associates]; it [was] a
wholly integrated component of CA-SCHEDULER and [had] no capacity for
independentuse." Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEX[S 14305, at *10-11.
112. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *13. Initially ZEKE could only run
onVSE. Id.
113. Id. at*14-15.
114. Id. at *15.
115. Id.; see also Kevlin, supra note 3, at 3.
116. The former employee had worked on an ADAPTER enhancement project at
Computer Associates and was able to complete the Altai project in only three months.
Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXES 14305, at *14-15.
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Associates learned that Altai might have appropriated part of
ADAPTER." 7 Computer Associates filed suit, and after litigation
began, the former Computer Associates employee admitted that he
had copied substantial amounts of Computer Associates' ADAPT-
ER source code when he "created" Altai's adapter module,
OSCAR 3.4."' Upon the advice of counsel, the president of Altai
ordered a rewrite of the offending version of OSCAR 3.4.119 The
rewritten program was entitled OSCAR 3.5.12' Though the new
version did not contain copied code, Computer Associates claimed
that Altai's OSCAR 3.5 "copied the structure, sequence and
organization of its Adapter program,"' 2' and thus infringed on
Computer Associates' copyright for ADAPTER.
Following a trial without a jury, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York found that Altai was liable for
copying ADAPTER into OSCAR 3.4 but that it was not liable for
copyright infringement in developing OSCAR 3.5." On appeal,
117. Id. at *15.
118. Id. The former employee had illegally taken a copy of Computer Associates'
ADAPTER source code with him when he left Computer Associates. Id. at *14. Thirty
percent of OSCAR 3.4 was copied from ADAPTER. Id. at *15. This version of
OSCAR was ultimately found to be infringing by both the district court and the
appellate court. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1991), affd, No. 91-7893,1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305 (2d Cir. Tune 22,1992).
119. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *16. Altai's goal was to use as much
of OSCAR 3.4 as could be saved without ifingement and to remove those portions that
had been copied from ADAPTER. The former employee was entirely excluded from the
process, and his copy of the ADAPTER code was locked away. Eight programmers
were put on the project, none of whom had been involved with the development of
OSCAR 3.4. The president of Altai, who had worked closely with the former employee
in developing OSCAR 3.4, provided the eight programmers with a description of the
portions that had to be reworked. While it had taken the former employee three months
to write all of OSCAR 3.4, it took the eight programmers six months to complete the
rewrite. Id.
120. Id. at *16-17. After the rewrite, Altai only shipped the new version, OSCAR
3.5, to its new customers. Further, Altai shipped OSCAR 3.5 as a "free upgrade" to its
customers who had already purchased OSCAR 3.4. However, the damage was already
done, and the lawsuit over the issue of OSCAR 3.4 remained. Id. at *16-17.
121. Kevlin, supra note 3, at 3.
122. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 570-71
(E.D.N.Y. 1991). Because Altai conceded that it had copied Oscar 3.4., the district
court focused solely on OSCAR 3.5. The court began by stating that one of the two
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the judgment of the district court in its entirety." In its decision,
the Second Circuit voiced dissatisfaction both with Congress'
decision to use copyright law as the vehicle to protect computer
programs and with the doctrines courts have developed in their
efforts to extend copyright protection to computer programs.
First, the Second Circuit stated its belief that copyright law is an
ill-suited means of protection for computer programs, and that
computer programs would be better protected by patent law." Of
course the Second Circuit recognized that its opinion differed from
Congress', and that it was bound to follow the copyright law
Congress had passed."2 However, the Second Circuit stated that it
did not intend to follow the case law that had developed since
elements necessary for a copyright infingement action had been met: The plaintiff,
Computer Associates, owned a valid copyright in ADAPIER. The court then turned its
attention to the remaining element: Was there copying of the copyrighted work by the
defendant9 Id. at 555. The court stated thatin order to prove its work had been copied,
Computer Associates had to prove "access and substantial similarity between the
works:' Id. at 557. In addition, Computer Associates had to show that its "expression
was 'improperly appropriated,' by proving that the similarities relate to copyrightable
material." Id. (citations omitted). The court assumed that Altai did have access. Id. at
558. The court then devoted the rest of its inquiry to the second element of copying-
substantial similarity.
123. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., No. 91-7893, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14305, at *4 (2d Cir. Tune 22, 1992). The trial court awarded $364,444 in
damages for OSCAR 3.4, which A]tai did not challenge on appeal. Id. at *4.
124. Id. at *57-58. The Second Circuit registered its belief that
[C]opyrightregistration-with its undiscriminating availability-is not ideally
suited to deal with the highly dynamic technology of computer science. Thus
far, many of the decisions is this area reflect the courts' attempt to fit the
proverbial square peg in a round hole.... [Platent registration, with its
exacting -up-front novelty and non-obviousness requirements, might be the
more appropriate rubric of protection.
Id. at *57.
The court further stated that"the resolution of this specific issue could benefit from
further legislative investigation-perhaps a CONTU IL" Id. at *58.
125. Id. at *58. "Congress has made clear that computer programs are literary
works entitled to copyright prtection .... Of course, we shall abide by these
instructions, but in doing so we must not impair the overall integrity of copyright law."
Id.
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Whelan.' The Second Circuit held that the Whelan test distorted
the balance between protection and dissemination intended by the
copyright law"27 because it was over-expansive in its protection of a
programmer's work." This balance, the Second Circuit maintain-
ed, could only be properly achieved by narrowing the scope of
copyright protection for computer programs.' 9
A. Narrowing the Scope with a New Test for Substantial
Similarity
In order to narrow the scope, the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision to use a new test for substantial
126. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *34-37 (citing Whelan Assocs. v.
Saslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,1224 n.1 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1031 (1987)).
127. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *3-4. The court stated: "[Tihe
copyright law seeks to establish a delicate equilibrium. On the onehand, it affords
protection to authors as an incentive to create, and on the other, it must appropriately
limit the extent of that protection so as to avoid the effects of monopolistic stagnation."
Id. at *3 (citation omitted).
128. Id. at *56. The court stated that "the crucial flaw in [Whelan's] reasoning is
that it assumes that only one 'idea,' in copyright law terms, underlies any computer
program, and that once a separable idea can be identified, everything else must be
expression." Id. at *34 (citing 3 NMMER, supra note 33, § 13.03[] at 13-78.33) (the
author has updated the Altai court's Nimmer citations to reflect the pagination of the
most recent edition of the treatise). Further, the Second Circuit averred that "the
sweeping scope of copyright protection engendered by the Whelan rule... 'enables first
comers to 'lock up' basic programming techniques as implemented in programs to
perform particular tasks."' Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *56 (citations
omitted). The court concluded that Whelan "results in an inhibition of creation by
virtue of the copyright owner's quasi-monopoly power." Id. at *56-57 (quoting Spivack,
supra note 4, at 765).
129. The courtstated:
While incentive based arguments in favor of broad copyright protection are
perhaps attractive from a pure policy perspective [citation omitted],
ultimately, they have a corrosive effect on certain fundamental tenets of
copyright doctrine. If the test we have outlined results in narrowing the scope
of protection, as we expect it will, that result flows from applying, in
accordance with Congressional intent, long-standing principles of copyright
law to computer programs.
Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *58-59.
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similarity.' The new test was "a three-step procedure, based on
the abstractions test utilized by the district court, in order to
detennine whether the non-literal elements of two or more
computer programs are substantially similar." 3' The abstractions
test looks at a work in increasingly general or abstract terms. Each
view contains less and less detail. At a certain point the view is
sufficiently general to be considered pure idea. It is at this point
that copyright protection ends. Any view of the work past this
point-such as a work's general outline-would be unprotectable
as mere idea and not the author's expression. The abstractions test
was the first of three steps proposed by the Second Circuit:
abstraction, filtration, and comparison."r
In the first step of the new test, a court would apply the
abstractions test in order to "dissect the allegedly copied
130. Id. at *35-36. In discussing why the use of other tests for substantial
similarity had failed, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that "[i]n the
context of computer programs, many of the familiar tests of similarity prove to be
inadequate, for they were developed historically in the context of artistic and literary,
rather than utilitarian, works:' Id. at *62 (citation omitted). However, the basis of the
new test was the abstractions test, which was also developed in the context of literary
works. It is difficult to determine whether the court was aware of this inconsistency, for
all the court says on the point was that "[w]hile the abstractions test was originally
applied in relation to literary works such as novels and plays, it is adaptable to computer
programs." Id. at *38. Further, while the court believed that the other substantial
similarity tests had failed because they had been developed for literary works, the court
was fully aware that Congress intended computer programs to be considered literary
works. Id. at *23-24.
131. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *36. The new test delineated by the
Second Circuit and the new test used by the district court were essentially the same:
"'We note that Judge Pratt's method of analysis effectively served as a road map for our
own." Id. at *64. The Second Circuit, however, formalized the test into a three step
process. Id. at *36.
132. Id. at *36-37.
133. Id. at *38. The court quoted Judge Learned Hand's articulation of the
abstractions test:
Upon any work... a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit
equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may
perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the [work] is
about... but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no
longer protected; since otherwise the [author] could prevent the use of his
"ideas", to which, apart from their expression, his property never extended.
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program's structure and isolate each level of abstraction contained
within it. This process begins with the code and ends with an
articulation of the program's ultimate function. 'I 34  The Second
Circuit observed that since the abstractions test mirrors the
programming processlas the test is well suited to computer
program infringement cases.3'
Having determined the levels of abstraction that contain
protectable expression, a court would then apply the second
step-filtration.' 37 At this phase a court would "sift out all non-
protectable material' 3'  by applying various copyright doctrines
such as merger, 39 scenes h faire, 4' and public domain.' 4' Thus,
Id. (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931)). See discussion, supra PartI.B.
134. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *39.
135. Id. at *39-40 (citing 3 NIMMER, supra note 33, § 13.03[F] at 13-78.32).
136. Id. For the proposition that the programming process mirrors the abstractions
test, the Second Circuit relied on the following passage from Nimner's copyright
treatise:
[A] programmer usually will start with a general description of the function
that the program is to perform. Then, a specific outline of the approach to this
problem is developed, usually by studying the needs of the end user. Next,
the programmer begins to develop the outlines of the program itself, and the
data structures and algorithms to be used. At this stage, flowcharts, pseudo-
code, and other symbolic representations often are used to help the
programmer organize the program's structure. The programmer will then
break down the problem into modules or subroutines, each of which addresses
a particular element of the overall programming problem, and which itself
may be broken down into further modules and subroutines.
Finally, the programmer writes specific source code to perform the
function of each module or subroutine, as well as to coordinate the interaction
between modules or subroutines. In many ways, the process capsulized above
mirrors the... abstractions test, [which is] readily adaptable to analyzing
computer software. At the start of the process, the programmer only has a
general notion of what the program is supposed to do ... [which] falls into the
realm of unprotectable ideas. When the program is completed, the
programmer will have produced code which will likely constitute protectable
expression. At some point between these extremes, the level of specificity is
sufficient to cross the line between idea and expression.
3 NIMER, supra note 33, § 13.03[F] at 13-78.31 to .32 (citations omitted).
137. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *40.
138. Id. at *37.
139. Id. at *41-42. The merger doctrine's underlying principle is that "when there
[Vol. 3:89
1992] CREATIVE EXPRESSION IN NONLITERAL ELEMENTS 115
application of the merger doctrine would filter out "those elements
of a computer program that are necessarily incidental to its function
[and] are [therefore] unprotectable."'142 Similarly, an application of
is essentially only one way to express an idea, the idea and its expression are
inseparable and copyright is no bar to copying that expression:' Id. (citing Concrete
Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 1988)). The
merger doctrine was first developed in Bakery. Selden. The case involved the issue of
whether ledger sheets, which were to be used with an accounting system explained in
plaintiff's books, enjoyed copyright protection. The Court held no, since they were
"necessarily incident to" the system of accounting described. Baker, 101 U.S. 99, 103
(1879).
140. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEX[S 14305, at *48. The scenes ?L faire doctrine rests
on the principle that "where 'it is virtually impossible to write about a particular
historical event or fictional theme without employing certain "stock" or standard literary
devices,' such expression is not copyrightable." Hoehling v. Universal City Studios,
Inc. 618, F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980). Hoehling was an
infringement suit involving several works on the Hindenberg disaster. The court
concluded that "similarities in representations of German Beer Halls, scenes depicting
German greetings such as 'Heil Hitler,' or the singing of certain German songs did not
lead to a finding of infringement because they were 'indispensable, or at least standard,
in the treatment of' life inNazi Germany." Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *48.
As applied to computer programs, the doctrine would exclude those design choices that
are circumscribed by external factors such as hardware specifications of the computer on
which software is to be run, business demands of the industry to be served, and
programming practices that are so widely accepted as to be "stock" Id. at *49-50.
141. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *51. Material that is in the public
domain is not protected by copyright even when it is incorporated into a copyrighted
work. 3 NwIMER, supra note 33, § 13.03[MI at 13-79. In the context of computer
programs, this means public domain software. Such software is often shared and
distributed through computer "bulletin boards:' Also, some "programming texts may
contain examples of actual code that programmers are encouraged to copy." Id. §
13.03[F] at 13-80.
142. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *31-32. However, as will be
discussed infra in Part IV, the court extended this doctrine so that "when one considers
the fact that the programmers generally strive to create programs 'that meet the user's
needs in the most efficient manner', the applicability of the merger doctrine becomes
compelling .... The more efficient a set of modules are, the more closely they
approximate the idea or process embodied in that particular aspect of the program's
structure." Id. at *43 (citations omitted). This expansion of the merger doctrine is a
powerful tool by which the Second Circuit narrowed copyright protection for computer
programs. But see 3 NBSER, supra note 33, § 13.03Mj] at 13-78.36 ("The merger
doctrine should be applied to deny protection to those elements dictated purely by
efficiency concerns").
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the scenes h faire doctrine would filter out those structural elements
that "flow naturally from considerations external to the author's
creativity."' 43 Finally, an application of the public domain doctrine
would filter out any remaining expression that is unprotectable
because it is not the expression of the author.
After applying the filtration step, a court would have isolated "a
core of protectable expression. In terms of a work's copyright
value, this is the golden nugget."''M The court would then apply the
third step-comparison."4  At this point "the court's substantial
similarity inquiry [would focus] on whether the defendant copied
any aspect of this protected expression, as well as an assessment of
[any] copied portion's relative importance with respect to the
plaintiff's overall program."'
The Second Circuit held that an application of this "three step
approach... not only comports with, but advances the constitu-
tional policies underlying the Copyright Act."4 A closer look at
how the court expanded and applied the test will demonstrate that
the Second Circuit was incorrect in this assertion.
B. Applying the New Test
The first step in the new test formulated by the Second Circuit
was to apply the abstractions test."4 The court observed that since
the abstractions test mirrors the programming process, the test is
well suited to computer program infringement cases.1 The court
143. 3 NIMnam, supra note 33, § 13.03[F] at 13-78.37. Again, the Second
Circuit's application of this doctrine is instrumental in narrowing the scope of copyright
protection for computer programs. See discussion infra in PartIV; but see id. § 13.03[F]
at 13-79 ("[A] court should apply this factor cautiously. Computer programming is a
highly creative and individualistic endeavor.").




148. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
abstractions test. The abstractions test was also used by the district court. See supra
notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
149. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *38-39.
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then reviewed the programming process: The programmer starts by
identifying the program's ultimate purpose and then goes on to
identify the necessary sub-tasks to fulfill that purpose. From there,
the programmer arranges these sub-tasks or modules, into a
flowchart"su "Once each necessary module has been identified,
designed and its relationship to the other modules has been laid out
conceptually,"15' the programmer codes the program into source
code. Once the source code is complete, it is translated into object
code.152
However, the five levels of abstraction that the district court
identified and the Second Circuit accepted bore little resemblance
to the programming process as described in the opinion. The five
levels identified were: object code, source code, parameter lists,
services required, and general outline.'5 These five levels are not
five increasingly general views of a computer program, nor are they
a schema that mirrors the programming process; they are merely
five different aspects of a computer program."m  Further, when
150. Id. at *6.
151. Id. at *9.
152. Id.
153. Id. at*65.
154. "Object code is a program expressed as binary numbers comprehensible to
the computer, a pattern of ones and zeros that causes the computer to execute a coherent
set of operations leading to a useful result. Most programs are written in some other
language more comprehensible to humans, and are then translated into object code...
." ANTmONY CLA , SOFTWARE, COPYRIGHT & COMPEmON, 31 (1989) [hereinafter
CLAPBS, SOFTWARE]. Source code is what a programmer produces when he writes or
"codes." Usually a programmer works in a "high 1a level programming language,....
such as FORTRAN, which uses arithmetic statements and English-like word
statements." Menell, supra note 17, at 1051 n.27 (citations omitted). Going from
source code to object code is not a process of abstraction, but of translation. The vice-
chairperson of CONTU stated that "the translation from source code to object code
simply converts the program into a differentphysical form.... Object code is simply a
machine translation, or conversion, of the source code." Melville B. Nimmer
Declaration, supra note 21, 16.
Parameter lists are the values that are passed between sub-programs or macros of
the program. Passing parameters can be analogized to filling in the blanks in a form
letter. CLAS, SOFWARE, supra at 72. Services required would be the function or
functions that the program was called upon to deliver. So for the ADAPTER or OSCAR
portion of the job-scheduling programs, this would be the system calls the program was
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taken in sequence, these five views do not reflect a logical
progression through "patterns of increasing generality [that] fit
equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out."'-5 Thus,
there is no identifiable point in the sequence where the "level of
specificity if sufficient to cross the line between idea and
expression."'-5 The court's use of the five-level abstraction model
is in fact at odds with the whole point of the abstraction test-viz.
finding the point where idea and expression diverge.
In addition, the court's application of the abstractions test failed
to include a level that referred to the program's detailed structure.
So, given the nature of the court's three-pronged test, this
restrictive analytical framework tended to deflect the court's inquiry
from the question of possible infringement involving the structure,
sequence, or organization of a program. Since the court's three-
pronged test limited the court's attention to the elements identified
during the first step-the abstraction test step--any element that
was not included in an abstraction level was dropped from the
inquiry. Therefore, since none of the abstraction levels contained
ADAPTER's sequential structure, the Altai court never asked
whether that structure had been infringed.
This omission flowed from the court's reliance on an expert
witness and especially the expert's opinions on program structure.
Though the Second Circuit discussed the district court's reliance on
the expert witness,'-7 it never reviewed in detail the expert's view of
a program's structure. This is unfortunate because the Second
called upon to make. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp 544, 559
(E.D.N.Y. 1991). The court did not discuss what the general outline was beyond stating
that it was the "high level structure." Altai, 775 F. Supp. at 561-62. A high level
structure has been analogized to the chapters in a book, with each chapter devoted to a
different major capability of the program. CLAME, SoFrWARM, supra at 31.
155. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
156. See Nimmer, A StructuredApproach, supra note 96, at 638.
157. The court stated that the expert was "instrumental in dismantling the intri-
cacies of computer science so that the court could formulate and apply appropriate rules
of law." Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., v. Altai, Inc., No. 91-7893, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14305, at *63 (2d Cir. June 22, 1992). Unfortunately, much of the expert's
opinion refocused the issues so that the court was unable to apply the appropriate rule of
law.
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Circuit's application of the abstraction test was clearly influenced
by the expert's analysis. The expert witness maintained that as far
as program structure went, programs could bp viewed in two ways:
the program as process, and the program as literal text' The
expert witness maintained that the sequential structure of a program
only emerged when a program processed. 59 Thus, what a
layperson would think of as the logical flow of the program-the
structure, sequence and organization of the program-only existed
when the program processed. Since sequential structure was solely
a component of the program's process, any discussion of the text's
structure was limited to the literal structure of the words.'O
Categorizing the sequential structure of a program as part of the
program's process had an enormous impact on the way in which the
158. Altai, 775 F. Supp. at 559-60. The court expert began by stating that a
program may be examined in its text or in its behavior. Further, each program
view-both as text and as behavior-has a structure. The program as text has the
structure of its literal text, i.e., the relationship of one word to another. The program as
behavior has the structure of its sequence of operations, i.e., the overall design and
organization of the program. Thus if the sequences of operations in a program are part
of the behavior, then they arenotpart of the text. Id. at 557.
The sequence of operations is what a layperson would think of as the "structure,
sequence and organization" of the program. The conclusion to be drawn from this
reasoning is that the "structure, sequence and organization"' of a program are part of the
program's process; that is, there is only sequential structure to a program when the
program is processing. The expert based his view of the literal text on the on the fact
that the commands in a program do not necessarily appear in the exact order in which
they are performed. Therefore, it is not always possible to glean the organization of the
program's commands from observing how a program processes. From this the expert
concluded that the only meaningful structure of the text is the literal structure of the
words, without any thought of "what's next." Id. at 557. While this might strictly be
true, one commentator noted that:
the simplest fashion in which control is passed [in a program] ... is seriatim.
Unless the [programmer] decides differently, the instructions in [his] program
willbe presented to the processor in the order in which they appear in the text
of the program. For good reason or convenience, the program author can
decide that control of the computer should be passed from one part of the
program to a remote program, rather than to a contiguous part. This can be
done by calling ormacro, or by branching to a subroutine.
CLAPEs, SOFTWARE, supra note 154, at 84.
159. See supra note 158.
160. Id.
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court applied the abstractions test, since the court was aware that
the copyright law did not protect any process or method., The
court, thus, logically focused its inquiry on the view of program as
text, implicitly adopting the expert's opinion that the only structure
to be found in the program as text was the structure of the literal
words. As a result, none of the levels of abstraction that the court
identified from the program as text contained the program's
detailed design or flow.
Applying the first step of the abstraction test, the court
excluded the program's structure, sequence, and organization from
its levels of abstraction. This effectively prevented any further
inquiry by the court as to whether the program had been infringed
by copying the structure, sequence, and organization. By not
considering this question, the court greatly constricted the scope of
copyright protection that Congress intended for computer
prograns. 1'2 Further, it did so without ever explicitly stating that it
had excluded the structure, sequence, and organization of a
computer program from copyright protection. Finally, the expert's
opinion and the court's own conclusions conflicted with the way in
which other commentators viewed programs' flow. One such
commentator had stated that "the flow of a program is roughly akin
to the flow of a plot in literature. It answers the question 'what
happens next ?,,,. This latter view is consistent with the legislative
history.164 CONTU had made no recommendations that would limit
copyright protection for the detailed design, structure, and flow of a
computer program, particularly not in circumstances where
copyright protection would be available for the structure and flow
of a novel or a play."6
The court also used the second step of its test (filtration) to
narrow greatly the scope of copyright protection for computer
programs. 16 The Second Circuit based its filtration step on the
161. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *27.
162. See supra notes 26-30.
163. Clapes, SiliconEpics, supra note 4, at 1529.
164. For a discussion of CONTU as legislative history, see supra note 20.
165. Melville B. Nimuner Declaration, supra note 21, q 30-31.
166. Although the Second Circuit formalized the application of various copyright
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"successive filtering method" suggested by David Nirmmer.'" How-
ever, in applying its filtration step, the court ignored the caveats and
explanatory notes that had accompanied Nimmer's explication of
his successive filtering method."
The first copyright doctrine that the court applied was the
merger doctrine."m The court began by stating what the merger
doctrine meant when applied to computer programs: "[W]hen
specific instructions, even though previously copyrighted, are the
only and essential means of accomplishing a given task, their later
use by another will not amount to iufinrigement.' 170 The court then
stated that programmers are often concerned with efficiency' and
that often times there is one way to program a function which is
known to be the most efficient. From this, the court correctly
concluded what Nimmer had concluded:' If a programmer uses
doctrines into its second filtration step, the district court had also employed the scenes a
faire doctrine in its analysis. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp.
544,559-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
167. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., No. 91-7893, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14305, at *40 CProfessor Nimmer suggests, and we. endorse, a 'successive
filtering method' for separating protectable expression from non-protectable material."
(citing 3 NIMER, supra note 33, § 13.0311F])).
168. See infra note 172.
169. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LMXES 14305, at *41; see supra note 139 for
explanation of the merger doctrine.
170. Id. at *42-43 (citations omitted).
171. Id. at *45 ('Efficiency is an industry-wide goal").
172. See also 3 NRM&IR, suprarnote 33, § 13.0311] at 13-78.35 to .36, which states
in pertinent part:
Although theoretically many ways may exist to implement a particular idea,
efficiency concerns can make one or two choices so compelling as to virtually
eliminate any other form of expression. In such a case, applying the merger
doctrine may dictate the conclusion that a particular way to implement an
idea is unprotectable....
Computer searching and sorting algorithms provide good examples of
this phenomenon .... A great deal of computer science research has been
devoted to developing methods of sorting or searching through data, and to
analyzing the relative efficiency of various methods.
When efficiency trade-offs betweenmethods are substantial .... common
sense would dictate that a programmer choose themost efficient method....
In such cases, the merger doctrine shouldbe applied to deny protection to
those elements of a program dictatedpurely by efficiency concerns.
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the most efficient method, he is not infringing because such a
compelling choice is said to have merged with the idea.
However, the court then expanded its application of the merger
doctrine to efficiency concerns in programming. It concluded that
"the more efficient a set of modules are, the more closely they
approximate the idea or process embodied in that particular aspect
of the program ."'174 Thus an experienced programmer who codes
efficient programs would lose his copyright protection. 75 This is
hardly what Nimmer intended when he stated that "the merger
doctrine should be applied to deny protection to those elements of a
program dictated purely by efficiency concerns."'176 Further, the
Second Circuit's application of the merger doctrine far exceeded
recent applications of the doctrine in copyright law1 7
The Second Circuit also applied the doctrine of scenes h faire178
to computer programs far beyond the scope foreseen by Ninmner.1 79
The Second Circuit began by stating the doctrine of scenes A faire
as it applied to computer programs: "[I]n many instances it is vir-
tually impossible to write a program to perform particular functions
in a specific computing environment without employing standard
techniques."'" 'This is a result of the fact that a programmer is
Id. (emphasis added).
173. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *43.
174. Id. at *43.
175. One commentator noted that it is "perhaps [the Second Circuit's unwil-
lingness to protect by copyright factors dictated by efficiency that most sharply dis-
tinguishes Altai from its predecessors." David Bender, Computer Associates v. Altai:
Rationality Prevails, COMPuTER LAw., Aug. 1992,1, 10.
176. 3 NIMnER, supra note 33, § 13.03[F at 13-78.36 (emphasis added).
177. Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc. 843 F. 2d 600, 606 (1st
Cir. 1988) ("When there is essentially only one way to express an idea, the idea and its
expression are inseparable and copyright is no bar to copying that expression."); Digital
Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softldone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449,458 (N.D.
Ga. 1987) ("'accepted test' in the computer area is: if 'there is only one way to express
the idea, the "idea" and "expression" merge and there is no copyrightable material')
(citation omitted).
178. See supra note 140 for an explanation of the scenes ? faire doctrine.
179. 3 NIMEm, supra note 33, § 13.03[F] at 13-78.35 to .42.
180. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *49 (citing 3 NIMMER supra note 33,
§ 13.03[F] at 13-78.37).
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often circumscribed by extrinsic considerations.""' Such extrinsic
factors include: the mechanical specifications of the hardware on
which a program is to ran; compatibility requirements of other pro-
grams with which the program must interact; computer manufact-
urer design standards; business needs; and widely accepted pro-
gramming processes."
According to the Second Circuit's statements, a court should
ask if a program element is original, or if it "flows naturally from
the considerations external to the author's creativity."'" Instead,
the Second Circuit extended the doctrine to mean that "functional
[program] elements.., do not qualify for copyright protection."1 4
Since all elements of a computer program are ultimately functional,
this is a far more potent application of the doctrine than that pro-
posed by Nimmer.'5 Nimmer suggested comparing the influence of
the programmer's creativity with the influence of the functional
consideration.'6 Further, Nimmer warned that "a court should
apply this factor cautiously. Computer programming is a highly
creative and individualistic endeavor. A court should not be led by
defense counsel to believe that complex [computer] programs con-
sist only of commonly known techniques and materials strung
together without significant originality or skill.""
The court's application of the public domain doctrine to
computer programs did not differ from that suggested by Nimmer.
Both held that those "elements of a computer program that have
entered the public domain by virtue of freely accessible program
exchanges and the like""8 are not protected by copyright.1
Upon a completion of the second step, the court stated that it
181. Id. (citing 3 N1M¢, supra note 33, § 13.03FJ at 13-78.36 to .42).
182. Id. (citing 3 NMMR, supra note 33, § 13.03[F at 13-78.37 to .42).
183. 3 NnMdER, supra note 33, § 13.03[F] at 13-78.37.
184. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *66.
185. Mere functionality was not on the list of external factors Ninmmer proposed to
be used as examples of scenes hL faire. 3 NI!mm., supra note 33, § 13.03[F] at 13-78.36
to .42.
186. Id. § 13.03[F at 13-78.37 to .38.
187. Id. § 13.03[MI at 13-79.
188. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *51.
189. Id.; 3 NMMER, supra note 33, § 13.03MiEI at 13-79.79 to .80.
124 FORDHAM ENT., MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. L.F.
had "sifted out all elements of the allegedly infringed program
which are 'ideas' or are dictated by efficiency or external factors, or
taken from the public domain, [but that] there may remain a core of
protectable expression."' In the third step, the court focused its
attention on this core of protectable expression. "At this point, the
court's... inquiry focuses on whether the defendant copied any
aspect of this protected expression, as well as an assessment of the
copied portions relative importance with respect to the plaintiff s
overall program."' 9' The core of protectable material identified
through steps one and two must be compared with the defendant's
program. This comparison is to "ascertain if there is a sufficient
degree of similarity to justify a finding of infringement."'92
The Second Circuit then reviewed the district court's
comparison of the two programs."9 The Second Circuit agreed
with the district court's analysis of the first levels of abstraction:
the source and object codes. Both courts agreed that since the
literal texts of ADAPTER and OSCAR 3.5 were not identical, there
was no substantial similarity.'m The Second Circuit also concurred
with the district court's analysis of the third level of abstraction:
the parameter lists. The district court had stated that "only a few of
the [parameter] lists . . . were similar to protected elements in
ADAPTER; the others were either in the public domain or dictated
by the functional demand of the program."' 95 The district court had
concluded that the similarity of the remaining protected parameter
lists did not "warrant a finding of infringement given their relative
contribution to the overall program."'- The Second Circuit did not
review the district court's holding on the fourth and fifth levels of
abstraction-the list of services and the general outline. At trial,
the district court had accepted the expert's opinion as to the
190. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *52.
191. Id.
192. 3 NIMMER, supra note 33, § 13.03[F] at 13-80.
193. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXS 14305, at *58.
194. Id. at *66. See also Altai, 775 F. Supp. at 562.
195. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *66 (quoting Altai, 775 F. Supp. at
560).
196. Id. at *66-67.
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copyrightability of both these levels.' The court accepted the
expert's opinion that the fourth level of abstraction (the list of
services) is of "minuscule" importance in the overall picture of
similarity.' The district court also adopted the expert's evaluation
on the fifth level of abstraction-the general outline. The general
outline "was not important, because it was so simple and obvious to
anyone exposed to the operation of the program."1m Thus the
district court found, and the Second Circuit agreed, that
ADAPTER and OSCAR 3.5 were not substantially similar, there
was no copying, and Altai had not infringed Computer Associates'
copyrght.'
However, in its review of the district court's decision, the
Second Circuit did not discuss the district court's use of the
expert's chart.Y° This chart assigned a weighted value to each of
the abstraction levels: "code" was ranked at 1000, and all the other
levels were ranked at 100, 1, or niLm The purpose of this chart
was to "quantify the relative importance" of the abstraction levels
that the court had identified.m Thus, when the court compared the
programs' similarity at each level, it would know how important
that similarity was. The court concluded that "the factor which is
197. Altai, 775 F. Supp. at 560.
198. Id. at562.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 560; Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *69.




List of services 1
Organization chart 1l.
Altai, 775 F. Supp. at 560.
202. Id.
203. This aspect of the comparison step was not discussed by the Second Circuit,
although the court did declare that it "affirmed the judgment of the district court in its
entirety." Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *4. Further, the court had earlier
declared its intention to join the company of courts that had extended copyright
protection to the nonliteral elements of computer programs. However, the weighting
scheme, which gave 1000 points to the computer code, and nil to the structure, would
make it difficult-if not impossible-for a plaintiff ever to prevail in a case for
infringement of nonliteral elements.
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by far the most important-code, rated at 1000-presents no
similarity at all because the code was rewritten." Despite the
enormous impact of such methodology, the Second Circuit never
reviewed the use of the chart or discussed the use of a similar chart
in future infdngement actions. Therefore, the district court, by its
system of comparison, made it more difficult to find infringement in
the absence of literal copying. °"
In total, the court's analysis denied copyright protection to the
nonliteral elements of computer programs. Because the court
omitted any view of the program's structure, sequence, or
organization from its abstractions test, it never even considered
whether there was substantial similarity of these elements. The
court's application of the filtration step excluded material that was
arguably protectable. Further, the system of comparison used by
the district court disfavored a finding of copyright infringement
absent literal copying. The Second Circuit was correct in its belief
that its new test would narrow the scope of copyright protection
for computer programs. The court was incorrect, however, to
think that its decision was "in accordance with Congressional
intent,"'  which had held that copyright protection should extend
to the nonliteral elements of computer programs."°
204. Altai, 775 F. Supp. at 560.
205. However, the Second Circuit never addressed the use of the chart, its effect
on the court's findings, or the use of similar charts in future actions.
206. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXMS 14305, at *58.
207. Id. at *59.
208. The vice-chairperson of CONTU, Melville Nimmer stated that-
not only the sequence of instructions but the selection, arrangement and
coordination of the elements of a program are also protectable under the
traditional principles of copyright protections of compilations. (17 U.S.C. §
103) ....
Another of the traditional copyright principles CONTU recognized as
applicable to computer programs is that, while copyright does not protect
against unauthorized use of very generalized abstractions, it does protect
against unauthorized use of plots, designs, arrangements and the like which
are sufficiently concrete to constitute an expression of the sequence of events,
episodes, incidents and segments and the structure of their development,
coordination and interplay.
Melville B. Nimmer Declaration, supra note 21,1 16. He further stated that:
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C. The New Test Viewed in Its Larger Context
It is also important to discuss the court's application of its new
three-step test taken in the context of the court's larger test for
copyright iffingement. The court applied its new test as the
second part of its two-part question: Was there access, and was
there substantial shnilarity?2 For the purposes of analysis, the
district court assumed that Altai had access to the ADAPTER code
when creating OSCAR 3.5. Thus, in determining whether Altai had
unlawfully copied protected aspects of Computer Associates'
ADAPTER, the district court narrowed the focus of its inquiry to
ascertaining "whether Altai's OSCAR 3.5 was substantially similar
to ADAPTER.""21 The Second Circuit stated that it approved of
the district court's analysis' This test for copying-access and
substantial similarity-is what was discussed above as the
compressed Arnstein test.
Unlike the full, two-pronged Arnstein test, the compressed test
requires the court to evaluate the copyrightability of the plaintiff's
work without knowing whether there was copying in general.
When applied to computer cases, the lack of such probative
knowledge can greatly color the court's decision. When a court is
asked to determine the degree to which two works are similar
because of the same external constraints or efficiency concerns, it
would be useful for the court to know if there was copying in
The general copyright principles applicable to [computer] programs have
been, and remain, those which are applicable to novels, plays ... textbooks,
musical works, maps, motion pictures, sound recordings and other categories
of work... CONTU had no views, and made no recommendations which
would negate the availability of copyright protection for the detailed design,
structure and flow of a program under the copyright principles that make
copyright protection available, in appropriate circumstances, for the structure
and flow of a novel, [or] a play.
Id. 12,28 (cited inBrief for Appellant, supra note 109, at 16).
209. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEX[S 14305, at *19; Altai, 775 F. Supp. at 558
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (both citing Walkerv. Time Life Films, Inc. 784 F.2d 44,48 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986)).
210. Altai, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *19.
211. Id.
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general before it made such a decision. The court could then better
determine if an element was in both programs because legitimately
there was no programming alternative, or rather because the
defendant simply copied.
The Second Circuit lacked such probative information, and thus
its inquiry focused away from the possibility of copying and instead
on the issue of the protectability of the plaintiff's program. Nimmer
had warned that "the mere fact that an element of a program might
fit within one of the [unprotected] categories . . . does not
necessarily mean that such an element is unprotectable, or that its
appearance in defendant's program cannot be the result of illegal
copying., 212 In sum, the Second Circuit did not examine the
elements of the program to see if they were illegally copied; they
examined the elements to see if they could be excluded from
protection.
IV. NBrTHER ALTAX NOR WHELAN PROPOSED A VIABIE TEST FOR
IDENTIFYING THE PROTECTABLE NONLrrERAL ELEMENTS IN A
COMPUTER PROGRAM
As we have seen, drawing the line between idea and expression
is a difficult task. Judge Learned Hand declared that "nobody:has
ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can."
213
Instead that distinction must "inevitably be [made] ad hoc."214 Both
the Second and the Third Circuits tried to fix that boundary, and
both failed. Neither test sufficiently enisured that computer
programs would receive the scope of copyright protection intended
by Congress.
The Third Circuit tried to formulate a test that would ensure
that computer programs received copyright protection comparable
to that accorded other literary works.1 The court believed that
this was necessary because of Congress' decision to include
212. Nimmer, A StructuredApproach, supra note 96, at 654.
213. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119,121 (2d Cir. 1930).
214. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960).
215. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
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computer programs as a literary work under the new copyright
law. 2 6 Further, Congress gave the idea/expression distinction as
the test that marked the limit of copyright protection for a
computer program.2? Since the idea/expression dichotomy is the
benchmark used in other literary cases involving nonliteral
copyright infringement, there was no evidence that Congress
intended to grant computer programs less copyright protection than
other literary works?2 9 In deciding to grant computer programs the
same broad range of protection enjoyed by other literary works, the
Third Circuit rejected policy arguments similar to the ones later
asserted by the Second Circuit, which advocated granting
software less protection than other literary works.' The Third
Circuit concluded that the policy reasons advanced did not
sufficiently prove that Congress had intended computer programs
to enjoy less copyright protection than other literary works.2 Y
Unfortunately, Third Circuit's Whelan test failed to accomplish
the goal of granting computer programs copyright protection on a
par with that granted other literary works' The test was so overly
broad that it protected ideas as well as expression, and thus it
violated copyright law.' Obviously, by protecting ideas, this was
more copyright protection than traditional literary works had ever
received. Thus, the Third Circuit failed to formulate successfully a
test that ensured computer programs the same range of copyright
protection extended to other literary works.
By contrast, the Second Circuit felt compelled to narrow the
scope of copyright protection for computer programs for two
reasons. The first was the failure of the Whelan test. The court
correctly asserted that Whelan's overly broad protection "enables
first comers to lock up basic programming techniques as
216. See supra notes 2, 64-65 and accompanying text.
217. See supranotes 26-30 and accompanying text.
218. See supranotes 34-45 and accompanying text; Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234.
219. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234.
220. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 8-9, 66-73 and accompanying text.
222. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234-35.
223. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
224. Id.
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implemented in programs to perform particular tasks."' ' The
second reason that the court advanced for narrowing the scope of
copyright protection for computer programs was its belief that the
balance of interests inherent in the copyright law was better served
by a greater dissemination of computer programs to the public. Of
course, increasing dissemination also meant limiting protection.?2
As noted above, the balance between dissemination and protection
is involved whenever a court makes the idea/expression
distinction.227 Thus a court wishing to change the balance in favor
of dissemination need only alter the idea/expression distinction so
that there is less protected expression. The Second Circuit wished
to change the balance, and it did so by proposing a new test that
altered the distinction.
The Second Circuit based its test on the successive filtering
method developed by Nimmer. Nimmer had developed the
successive filtering methodin the wake of Whelan's failures. 8 The
method conscientiously and rigorously applied copyright doctrines
and judicial tests in order to determine what was expression and
what was idea, what was protectable and what was not.' Further,
the successive filtering method took into account the need for a test
that could be applied by non-specialists, yet would yield just
results? 0' ° Unfortunately, the test formulated by the Second Circuit
needed to be applied by an expert, and it yielded unjust results.
The three-pronged test formulated by the Second Circuit simply
discouraged a finding of copyright infringement absent a finding of
literal copying of the program's text. This was far less protection
than other literary works received.2 ' Thus, the Second Circuit
225. See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text
226. See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 106 and accompanying text; 3 NIaMER, supra note 33, §
13.03[F] at 13-78.32.
229. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text
230. See Nimmer, A StructuredApproach, supra note 96, at 626.
231. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Iaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d
Cir. 1986) ("The copyrights of other literary works can be infinged even when there is
no substantial similarity between the works' literal elements. One can violate the
copyright of a play or book by copying its plot or plot devices.") (citations omitted); see
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failed to formulate successfully a test that ensured computer
programs the same range of copyright protection as other literary
works, as intended by Congress.' In doing this, the Second
Circuit established a sort of second-class patent law specifically for
computer programs:
[In exercising] its broad Constitutional Authority to enact
patent and copyright laws in order to promote the progress
of science and the useful arts, Congress took substantially
different approaches in balancing competing interests.
Under copyright law, authors are afforded much weaker
protection than inventors are afforded under patent law:
copyright gives no protection for ideas, no matter how
original, and no protection against independent creation. In
light of this weak protection, the subject matter capable of
being protected is much broader in scope than under patent
law (original authorship rather than novel and non-obvious
inventions) and the term of protection is much longer.
These trade-offs reflect a reasonable and carefully crafted
balancing by Congress of the various diverse interests it was
seeking to further.'
Thus by drastically reducing the portions of a computer program
that can be protected against copyright infringement, the Second
Circuit upset the balance of protections created by Congress.
Congress must reestablish this balance by removing any ambiguities
from the copyright law that would prevent a broad scope of
protection for computer programs.
Over three years ago, Congress began to investigate the ambig-
uities in the copyright law as it applied to computer programs. In
1989, the Congressional Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and
Judicial Administration asked Congress' Office of Technological
Assessment (OTA) to prepare a report that addressed computer
technology and the American intellectual property system.m In
also supra note 208.
232. See supranotes 206-208.
233. Allen R. Grogan, Bonito Boats and Whelan: A Simple Contrast Between
Patent and CopyrightLaw, CoMEuim LAW., Iuly, 1989,33, 34.
234. Richard Raysmar & Peter Brown, OTA Report. Finding a Balance for
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May of 1992, OTA presented its report to Congress.23 After
careful analysis of the existing law and policies, OTA "identified
three policy areas-the appropriate scope of copyright protection,
patent protection for software-related inventions and algorithms
and complications facing libraries and users of digital inform-
ation-that Congress might want to address, and outlined possible
options for legislative action for each."
OTA noted that the first policy area-determining the proper
scope of copyright protection for software-was complicated by
the functional aspect of computer software.3 7 OTA listed several
approaches to the problem. 8
First, Congress could continue to treat computer programs as
literary works, but "could clarify or modify the scope of patent
and/or copyright [through the use of] definitional changes." 39
Thus, Congress could specifically exclude or include certain
program elements from copyright protection.' However, OTA
noted that if Congress chose this route, Congress would have to
keep the list of definitions in the Copyright Act current.24' OTA's
second suggestion was that Congress "could establish a separate
category in the Copyright Act for 'computer programs' instead of
treating them as literary works." 22 OTA noted that one "advantage
of this approach would be that the courts would not have to apply
the same principles to software and other literary works, whose
economics, patterns of innovation/dissemination and useful life
spans are quite different."2' However, OTA also stated that "there
Software Protection, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 10,1992, at 3.
235. OFcs oF TEcHNoLoGY AsSESSMENT, U.S CONG., PUs No. OTA-TCT-527,
INDING A BALANcE: COMPUTER SOFwARE, JNTmxEcruAL PRoPRTY, AND THE CHAL-
LENGE OF TECHNOLOGCAL CHAN'GE (1992).
236. Raysman & Brown, supra note 234, at 3. Only the first of these three policy
areas, the appropriate scope of copyright protection, is within thd scope of this note.
237. See OTA REPORT, supra note 235, at 28-29.
238. Id. at29.
239. Id.
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would be a period of uncertainty as a new body of case law
developed. ' " As a third proposal, OTA suggested that "[i]nstead
of establishing a separate category for software within Section
102(a), Congress might limit that scope of literary copyright to the
code, with the possibility of adopting a complementary regime for
elements of software design and functionality." OTA's fourth
suggestion was that computer programs could remain within the
category of literary works, but Congress could "establish legislative
bounds holding the extent of copyright as a literary work to the
code (as text), not to the behavior of the program when it is
executing or to 'interfaces.' [Congress could then] determine
whether the latter are to be covered by a complementary, sui
generis regime."' Finally, eTA suggested replacing copyright
protection for computer programs with a sui generis framework of
protection that would include the code as well as other program
elements.2 OTA pointed out that law that is specifically tailored
to software could include features not permitted under copyright
law, such as a shorter term length, or specific infringement
criteria.m However, OTA also pointed out that it would be
"difficult to define what is and what is not covered under copyright
law and under the new, sui generis law. A new body of case law
would have to develop, as would international agreements,
particularly regarding the sui generis mode of protection.""
OTA's suggestion that Congress simply clarify the existing
copyright law is the soundest solution for courts now facing
infringement cases of the nonliteral elements of software. A "new
system would create unacceptable uncertainty." Further, a new
body of law will inevitable create new ambiguities that will
eventually have to be clarified. A better approach would be for
244. Id.
245. Id. (emphasis in original).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 30-31.
248. Id. at30.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 28 (OTA notes that this is the contention of those commentators who
argue that the existing copyright law is working well, both domestically and
internationally) (citations omitted).
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Congress to clarify the ambiguities that have already surfaced. That
would provide courts with a large body of existing case law, and
some direction as to how to apply it. -
Congress should begin by stating in clear and unmistakable
terms that computer programs are granted the full panoply of rights
afforded to more traditional literary works.l Congress should
state that the copyright law applies equally to the nonliteral and
literal elements of a computer program, and it should reiterate that
the idea/expression distinction is the test for copyright protection. 5?
Further, Congress should add that the issue of nonliteral versus
literal elements in an alleged infringement case should have no
bearing on the idea/expression distinction. The test should be
applied equally in instances of nonliteral and literal appropriation.
If Congress clearly indicates that nonliteral and literal elements are
equally protected under the copyright law, a future court could not
institute an approach explicitly designed to provide less copyright
protection for nonliteral infringement than for literal infringement of
computer programs, as the Second Circuit did in Altai.53
In order to ensure that computer programs are granted the same
copyright protection as other literary works, Congress should
briefly explain that computer programs are to be treated the same as
other literary works because both types of work contain potentially
protectable expression outside the literal text. Congress should also
make it clear to courts that they can grant computer programs
copyright protection based on the same understanding of similarity
that is applied in cases involving other literary works.2 Courts
should feel encouraged to draw analogies between a novel and a
program's structure.
251. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text
252. See supra note 26 and accompanying text
253. See supra notes 149-209 and accompanying text
254. Melville Nimmer stated that "[i]n my treatise, I have analyzed in some depth
the standards for determining when a copyrighted work has been infringed through the
duplication of its fundamental plot, structure and arrangement (the pattern test). In my
opinion, CONTU fully expected that these traditional principles be applied to computer
programs." Melville B. Nimmer Declaration, supra note 21, 125; see also supra notes
121-126 and accompanying text.
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Thus, a court should consider any organizational construct that
a programmer utilizes to structure a program as, at least, potentially
protectable as expression. This would eliminate a court's ability to
construe sequential structure as process, and thus to deny
copyrightability.e 5 Congress should also consider providing a non-
inclusive list of the nonliteral elements of a computer program that
are to enjoy copyright protection to the extent that they embody an
author's expression. However, if Congress does provide such a
list, it must emphasize that the list is only illustrative, and not
exclusive. Such a list should include the organization, sequence,
and structure of the overall program and its subroutines and
modules, to the extent that they do not embody mere ideas. Stating
that the idea/expression distinction could be made at more than one
level would prevent future courts from providing the same overly
broad protection found in the Whelan test, which identified a
program with a single idea.m
If Congress emphasizes its intention to grant computer
programs the same broad copyright protection as other literary
works, Congress will encourage courts to apply the vast body of
case law and doctrines. 7 This is extremely appropriate, given that
the creative process of computer programming is similar to that of
writing a more traditional literary work."8 Further, by clearly
indicating that computer programs contain protectable expression
beyond the literal text, Congress will ensure the proper balance
between dissemination and incentive. s9 Much of a programmer's
skill finds expression in a program's overall design.' To deny
255. See supra notes 154-159 and accompanying text
256. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text
257. See Clapes, Silicon Epics, supra note 4, at 1501 ("Traditional rules of
copyright law adapt very comfortably to (computer programs].").
258. Id. at 1507 ("That such an authorship takes place in the context of a
programming language does not change its essential nature.").
259. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text
260. Clapes, SiliconEpics, supra note 4, at 1534-35.
As with structure, flow and logic, design is an attribute that may be
considered at a high level of abstraction or at a low level of abstraction. The
low level of abstraction, the program's detailed design, is a complex web of
structure, sequence, pattern and organization. The resulting combination is a
tapestry of decisions and actions that is the essence of the author's expression.
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copyright protection for that expression is to eliminate incentive.m
Congress must make clear that the creative expression found in a
computer program's nonliteral elements is protected under the
copyright law.
CONCLUSION
Other U.S. courts should not follow either the Altai decision or
the Whelan decision. Though opposite in their approaches, both
decisions failed. The Altai decision should not be followed because
it grants far less copyright protection to computer programs than
was intended by Congress. Further, the Altai decision upsets the
balance of protections envisioned by Congress.26 The Whelan
decision errs in the opposite direction because it grants protection
to a program's incorporated ideas, and thus it fails to strike the
proper balance between public dissemination and individual
incentive mandated by the Constitution. The Altai decision was an
answer to the failings of the Whelan decision. Yet the Altai
decision failed as strikingly as the Whelan decision. A third test is
not the answer. The Altai test demonstrated that even the most
thoughtful test does not guarantee just results.
United States courts are now faced with alternatives in deciding
software copyright infringement cases. A court wishing to grant
protection to the nonliteral elements of a program follows Whelan;
a court wishing to deny such protection follows Altai. A Supreme
Court resolution may be required in the short term to avert the
forum shopping that will become inevitable. However, a
Congressional clarification of the copyright as it applies to
computer programs would be a superior solution.
Because computer programs as a form of expression are not
well-understood by the makers of law and policy, they are
presently at risk of being relegated to the backwaters of
copyright, to an inferior status at law in which the authors
Id. (citing P. BRUCE & S. PEDERSON, TaE SOF£WARE DE ELoPLET PROjECE: PLANN]NG
AND MANAGEMw1r 85-86 (1982)).
261. Id. at 150910.
262. Grogan, supra note 233, at 34.
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of this class of literary work would be accorded less than
Sfullprotection against the taking of their original works of
authorship.2
Armed with a clarification of the law, courts could successfully
apply the broad body of copyright law and doctrines to computer
programs cases on an ad hoc basis, which after all, seems to be
inevitable.
Lisa C. Green
263. Clapes, Silicon Epics, supra note 4, at 1499.

